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Abstract 
William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to 
Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to 
Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in 
successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between 
rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that 
mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine does not adequately 
explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to 
Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I 
suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and 
metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure 
of what I will call sematic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart 
explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation as 
evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance presents 
a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans 
recourse to metaphysics. 
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“Metaphor was the beginning of wisdom, the earliest scientific method” (Radman 1997, 43).  
 
Introduction 
William Whewell appeals to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain the 
way that mind and world interface and merge. In this paper, I argue that Whewell’s metaphor 
provides a robust explanatory tool for those who hold that mind and world are inextricably 
integrated or entwined, i.e. that there is no strict epistemology/ontology divide. Experience 
pragmatists hold such a view. They consider both strict realism and strict anti-realism about the 
external world untenable and find metaphysical attempts to explain the merger of mind and 
world unconvincing.  
Misak (2013, 2014) argues that contemporary pragmatists should return to the classical 
pragmatists’ belief in the objectivity of reality without losing their core commitment to 
pragmatism. She identifies two lineages in the history of pragmatism. One is a line of subjectivist 
influence that runs from James, to Dewey, then Rorty; the other is an objectivist line that runs 
from Peirce, to Sellers, and now the so-called new pragmatists (see Misak 2007; Levine 2010). 
New pragmatists attempt to rehabilitate objectivity in two ways: (1) from within language, i.e. in 
terms of intersubjectivity or communal agreement; proponents include Stout, Price, Brandom, 
and Davidson; or (2) by appeal to experience as an objective mediator between mind and word; 
proponents include Putnam, McDowell, Misak and Levine (see Levine 2019 ch 1 for detail). Our 
concern in this paper is with this latter group of which I take Levine as an exemplar. 
By putting experience first, experience pragmatists like Levine can secure a link between our 
conceptual subjectivity and the objective world out there. Invoking experience is intended to 
allow the external world to play a constraining epistemological role without the kind of God’s-
eye view metaphysics that pragmatism rejects. The world is not given; instead, the world is 
experienced.  
I will call the merger of mind and world MWmerger. 
MWmerger: The coming together and integration of mind and world.  
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Our intuition is that mind and world are separate metaphysical domains (Forstmann and Burgmer 
2015) linked by something like a correspondence relationship: the so-called “correspondence 
intuition” (Horwich 1998). Those who hold that mind and world are inextricably integrated or 
entwined owe an account of how this unity obtains. My metaphorical thesis is intended to 
provide just the tool to do so. Although I focus on experience pragmatism here, my argument 
may be informative to anyone who cares to explicate MWmerger. 
Hylomorphism is enjoying something of a revival in the literature. Varieties have recently been 
developed in philosophy of quantum theory (Pruss 2017), philosophy of biology (Austin 2017) 
and philosophy of mind (Jaworski 2020). Most contemporary writers working on hylomorphism 
however, not only utilise the mereological tools of analytic metaphysics that pragmatists and 
likeminded thinkers avoid, but also overlook the applicability of hylomorphism to MWmerger. My 
Whewellian account of how form/matter hylomorphism can explain MWmerger should therefore 
make a novel contribution to the literature. Explaining MWmerger matters because explicating the 
relationship (if there is one) between mind and world is one of our most central and most 
challenging philosophical problems.  
In section 1, I introduce Levine’s experience pragmatism. I argue that a sceptic may reasonably 
request more explanatory detail from Levine on how exactly MWmerger occurs in experience.  
In section 2, I briefly introduce hylomorphism as found in the work of Aristotle and Kant. This 
historical explication outlines the genealogical motives for Whewell’s distinctive hylomorphic 
account of MWmerger.  
In section 3, I detail Whewell’s thesis that the process of successful scientific empirical inquiry 
suitably entwines mental form and worldly matter. That is, Whewell’s form/matter metaphor – as 
applied specifically to empirical inquiry – potentially explains how MWmerger obtains.  
I return to Levine in section 4 and suggest a way for Levine (and likeminded thinkers) to answer 
the sceptic from section 1. I contrast metaphorical explanations to reductive explanations; both 
are suitable in different explanatory circumstances. We may prefer a reductive explanation of 
MWmerger, but, since one does not seem to be available, we must settle for a metaphorical 
explanation. I argue that Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor aptly fulfils this role. This is because 
it displays a suitable measure of what I will call semantic distance. Semantic distance is a 
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measure of an explanation’s explanatory power (whether it is a reductive or metaphorical 
explanation). To enjoy maximal explanatory power an explanation must find a suitable degree of 
short versus long semantic distance between explanandum and explanans. That is, explanandum 
and explanans must be close enough in meaning to be intuitively analogous, but also faraway 
enough in meaning for the explanation to surprise us and provide novel insights into phenomena 
needing explanation. 
I conclude that incorporating metaphorical explanation as evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism 
and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance provides those who hold to MWmerger but 
eschew metaphysics a valuable new tool to add to their explanatory toolbox. 
1. Levine and the return of experience 
In this section, I introduce Steven Levine’s experience pragmatism as an exemplar of a 
contemporary view that holds to MWmerger. The goal is to show how Levine attempts but 
ultimately fails to satisfactorily explain how mind and world integrate in MWmerger. This critique 
precedes my introduction of Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor in section 2 that I will argue can 
help in this regard. As we will see, there are significant similarities between Levine and 
Whewell’s theses. Adopting Whewell’s hylomorphism metaphor will however grant Levine’s 
account of MWmerger the extra explanatory power it requires.  
1.1. Levine and MWmerger 
Levine aims to restore objectivity to pragmatism and thereby free it from the influence of Rorty’s 
(e.g. 1989, 1991) neo-pragmatist subjectivism. Levine believes it is possible to formulate “a 
pragmatic account of objectivity that can accommodate the fact that what is objective constrains 
our perception, thought, and action in a way that is beyond our control” (Levine 2010, 586 
original emphasis). In other words, the “world can play a rational role in the formation of our 
world-directed beliefs” (Levine 2010, 588).  
Thus, although the pragmatist does not care for pure reason or things in themselves, she can 
appeal to a notion of agent-independent epistemic constraint. For Levine, there is a reality 
manifested in experience that extends beyond rather than depends upon our points of view. 
Channelling Dewey, he argues that the interaction of our sensory motor activity with problems in 
the world is the locus is epistemic constraint the objectivist is seeking (Laudan 1977 and Kitcher 
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1993 make similar arguments). Reason (in the mind) and stimulus (of the world) are entwined in 
our habits as experiential agents. Inner “rational relations” and outer “causal relations” are 
wrapped into one tangible knowledge-seeking and knowledge-forming experiential enterprise 
(Levine 2019).  
Levine cites James who analogously discusses a sculptor working on a block of marble: “[t]he 
mind… works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of stone” 
(James in Levine 2014, 4; see also Misak 2014, 4). The sculptor, says Levine, does not construct 
matter (the marble block), yet he is constrained regarding what he can do with it. Similarly, we 
do not create sensations, yet they constrain what we can think and do. Sensation is both beyond 
our control and at the same time dependent on our interests and our actions to some degree.  
As we will see in section 2, this attempted fusion of internalism (anti-realism) and externalism 
(realism) finds its genesis in Kant and then Whewell. Although Whewell thinks MWmerger obtains 
in successful scientific inquiry while Levine thinks it obtains in experience broadly construed, 
we can plausibly consider scientific inquiry to be a special case of experience (I argue in section 
4.2 that we should prefer Whewell’s more focused locating of MWmerger). 
I now argue that the sceptic can justifiably press Levine for more explanatory detail on how mind 
and world interface and integrate in MWmerger. Without any metaphysical tools however, a 
pragmatist like Levine cannot convincingly answer the sceptic.  
1.2. Levine and the sceptic 
For Levine, if “thought is to be objective, of the way things genuinely are, it must be objective 
by way of a consideration of our experiential encounter with the world” (2019, 10). One wonders 
however what exactly this encounter entails. Just how are mind and world entwined in 
experience? How do these two prima facie distinct domains interface exactly? Much ink has 
been spilled on this important question, and there appears to be no convergence to consensus on 
the answer. For those who steer clear of metaphysics in the first place, the question is all the 
more challenging.  
Pragmatist attempts to explain MWmerger have the potential to become lengthy and elaborate 
rhetorical exercises. Perhaps, this is inevitable without the detailed – albeit speculative – 
metaphysics that pragmatism forbids. Without correspondence principles, referential semantics 
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or mereological reductions for example the pragmatist relies on a style of argument that is 
systematically rhetorical. In place of deductive formalisms, the standard pragmatist technique 
seems to involve the repetitive use of synonymous terms in slow and methodical explication. 
Levine for example expresses MWmerger variously as follows: 
the materiality of our natural bodies must incorporate, and be molded by, certain of our 
subjective purposes (2019, 58–59 emphasis added); 
this incorporation infuses habits not with conceptual content but with a type of embodied 
sense or know-how (2019, 59 emphasis added, original emphases removed); 
To say that an experience is ‘mediated’ is to say that an earlier phase of an experience is 
interpreted by a later phase of the experience in light of its outcome or result (2019, 66 
emphasis added). 
Here, the relationship between some mind-like process with some world-like process is 
expressed respectively as “moulded”, “infused” and “mediated”. Experience is a kind of function 
or ‘black box’ that transforms mind into world and vice versa. However, to explain how 
MWmerger obtains in experience – how the transformation occurs within the black box – Levine 
reverts to the kind of synonyms listed above (moulded, infused etc). The sceptic will be left 
wondering however how exactly mind and world are moulded, infused etc. As Henne notes, 
Levine says “very little… about inquiry, whether ordinary or scientific, or about the relation 
between the structure of our assertions and the structure of the world” (2019 np). 
It is partly for this reason that Rorty and other subject-oriented pragmatists question the 
epistemic relevance of an objective world mediated by experience as a constraint on our thoughts 
and beliefs. As Levine notes, “Rorty, Davidson, and Brandom all argue that this is a question we 
ought not feel compelled to answer, for to do so is to cross a line that ought not to be crossed, 
namely between reasons and causes” (2019, 167). For Rorty, without recourse to fine-grained 
metaphysics, the question of how exactly mind and world interface is mute. All we know is the 
subjective side of the mind/world or subject/object divide, and this is therefore all we can 
account for.  
Interestingly, the metaphorical explanatory approach I will argue for involves a kind of 
synonymy. Both argument by metaphor and argument by synonymy are forms of argument by 
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analogy.1 In both cases, we are told that A is to be thought of as analogous to B; A is explained 
by way of its likeness to B. Pragmatists like Levine are thus already utilising a metaphorically 
inclined approach to explaining MWmerger. For Levine, MWmerger is analogous to a moulding, 
infusing, and/or mediating relationship. My goal here is to make this analogical reasoning more 
precise by making explanatory appeal to Whewell’s form/matter metaphor. 
Before fleshing out this argument, let us first look at the genealogy of Whewell’s form/matter 
metaphor. It is important to historically situate Whewell’s argument so as to understand the 
motives for his conclusion. I therefore now briefly discuss Aristotle and Kant’s hylomorphisms 
that influence Whewell’s version introduced in section 3.  
2. Aristotle and Kant’s hylomorphism 
Aristotle famously proposed that things in the world are compounded of a hylomorphic synthesis 
of form and matter. As substances come into and go out of existence, the underlying matter out 
of which they are composed persists through change, while their form is the varying essence or 
functional identity they have at some specific time and place. Like Levine, Aristotle used the 
following example. A bronze metal statue is melted and remoulded into a piece of jewellery. The 
bronze metal is the matter that takes the form of firstly a statue then secondly a piece of jewellery 
as its function changes. For Aristotle, form and matter are neither same nor separate. The one 
cannot exist without the other, yet neither can they be pulled apart. Form enmeshed in matter 
constitutes all things (Aristotle 1925, vi 1, vii 11). I will call Aristotle’s form/matter 
hylomorphism FMmetaphor. 
FMmetaphor: All objects are composed of entwined yet also distinct structural form and 
substantial matter.  
While, for Levine, MWmerger occurs in experience, for Kant, MWmerger occurs in perception. 
Although he did not consider himself an Aristotelian by any means, Kant thought of MWmerger in 
hylomorphic terms. MWmerger is analogous to the way form/matter merge in Aristotelean objects 
such as statues. There is an internal and an external constraint on perceptual knowledge. The 
former is our a priori mental categories; the latter is the a posteriori content of sensation. When 
                                                             
1 Arbib and Hesse argue that “all language is metaphorical”; “linguistic reference always depends on perceived 
similarities and differences” (1986, 153; see also Lakoff and Johnson 1980; cf. Pylyshyn 2007 and Camp 2020). 
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it comes to perception, says Kant, “[s]pace and time are its pure forms; sensation as such as its 
matter” (1996, A43/B60). Form and matter are “two concepts which lie at the basis of all other 
reflection, so very inseparably are they bound up with the use of the understanding” (Kant 1996, 
A266/B322). Moreover, as Whewell will later affirm, 
[w]ith every manner in which we are affected there are two parts: matter, i.e., the 
impression of sensation, and form, i.e., [the] manner in which the impressions are unified 
in my mind (Kant in Pollok 2014; see also Kant 1996, A20/B34, A42/B59, A51/B75). 
Pollok (2014) calls this “Kant’s transcendental hylomorphism” which shifts Aristotle’s 
ontological hylomorphism to epistemology. Application of the understanding provides the form 
that ‘shapes’ the matter that constituting the manifold of sense impressions. Form is a mental 
overlay on matter rather than a metaphysical universal coupled to matter independent of 
cognition as Aristotle had it (see Buchdahl 1971; Breitenbach 2011 and Rohlf 2020 for detail).  
Kant shares with Whewell a common influence in Bacon who proposed a middle way between 
rationalism (realism) and empiricism (anti-realism). Bacon was critical of Aristotle’s claim that 
the contents of sensation are given to the understanding. Instead, by way of a corrective inductive 
method, the scientifically trained mind adjusts to and organises sensed phenomena in the 
empirically informed process of gaining knowledge of the world (Bacon 1878; see also Hintikka 
1974; Pérez-Ramos 1996 and Klein and Giglioni 2020).2 Whewell likewise emphasises the 
mutual role played by the world presented in sensation and our cognitive faculties that affect it. 
Knowledge of the world advances by way of an evolving dual rational/empirical method as 
evident in science properly practiced.  
According to Snyder, Whewell’s philosophy is “most notable for its compound nature, being an 
amalgam of 19th century British empiricism and a curious Kantian-Platonic type of idealism” 
(1994, 785). For our purposes, the most significant aspect of Whewell’s amalgam is his notion of 
subject and object hylomorphically entwined in scientific empirical inquiry.  
3.  Whewell’s form/matter metaphor 
                                                             
2 Bacon therefore serves as a genealogical link between Aristotle and Kant (see Floridi 2018). Wolff’s (1963) 
experimental philosophy, as influenced by Suarez, made a similar impression on Kant (see Heider 2015 and Hettche 
and Dyck 2019). See Langton (1998) for comparisons between Kant and Leibniz and Locke. 
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Like Levine and Kant, for Whewell, there is both an internal and an external constraint on 
knowledge. Whewell calls the former fundamental ideas (approximately Kantian categories); the 
latter is an outer reality apparent in sensation (see Wettersten 2001 and Snyder 2006 ch 1 for 
detail). There is however no clear-cut separation between subject and object, between mind and 
world or between theory and fact.3 For Whewell, these complimentary elements are conjoined in 
empirical practice producing scientific truths. Scientific inquiry oscillates between passive 
reflection and active participation; theory and fact co-evolve in the progress of science.  
According to Buchdahl, Whewell emphasises “the Kantian doctrine that it is not possible to 
make a sharp distinction between the ‘sensational’ and the ‘intellectual’ aspects of knowledge; 
that the division between ‘data’ and ‘inference’ is artificial” (1971, 350). Every inquiring act 
knits together putatively juxtaposed theoretical and factual elements. Metaphorically, “there is a 
mask of theory over the whole face of nature” (Whewell 1840, I, 24). One may think of 
“Sensations as the Matter, and Ideas as the Form, of our knowledge” (Whewell 1858, I, 38).4 
For Whewell, there is interpretation involved in even our simplest observations. We do not 
perceive solid objects for example; we only perceive shapes, colours and shades. As with Kant, 
the solidity these sense-impressions have is a unifying form provided by the subject. Whewell 
writes, 
Sensations and Ideas in our knowledge are like Matter and Form in bodies. Matter cannot 
exist without Form, nor Form without Matter: yet the two are altogether distinct and 
                                                             
3 Whewell often uses the terms ‘subject’, ‘structure’, ‘theory’, ‘thought’ and ‘form’ interchangeably, all of which 
approximately denote our putative inner mental realm. The same goes for ‘object’, ‘substance’, ‘fact’, ‘sensation’ 
and ‘matter’, all of which approximately denote the putative outer worldly realm. 
4 It should be noted that hylomorphism was not Whewell’s primary way of reasoning about experience and 
knowledge. Much of his epistemology focused on inductive knowledge which led to his famous consilience of 
inductions thesis. In science, once the mind has grouped together some facts (as in hylomorphism), we extend the 
conception so-formed to unknown testable cases. This “special process in the mind”, says Whewell, is the process of 
induction; “[w]e infer more than we see” (1858a, I: 46). Further, when several empirically confirmed lines of 
induction converge on the same conclusion, we can take such a conclusion to be true; this is the consilience of 
inductions (see Laudan 1971; Butts 1987; and Snyder 1994, 2021 for more on Whewell and induction).  
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opposite. There is no possibility either of separating, or of confounding them (1840, I, 
xvii–xviii). 
According to Morrison, “Whewell’s antithesis is an attempt to illuminate the relation between 
epistemology and ontology by stressing their interactive nature” (1997, 419–420). Whewell’s 
amalgamation of subject and object “embodies a kind of identity between the knower and the 
thing known” (Morrison 1997, 422). 
For Whewell, mind and world merge successfully when they are most perfectly synchronous, 
and this synchrony synthesises truths. Scientific inquiry – involving hypothesis, induction, 
observation, experiment, prediction, verification and consilience – is the method that most 
successfully brings mind and world into such alignment. That is, mental form and worldly matter 
are most harmoniously entwined in the activity of successful empirical inquiry at the heart of the 
scientific method properly practised (see Ducasse 1951a, 1951b, Schickore 2018 and Snyder 
2006 ch 1, 2021 for detail on Whewell’s scientific method).  
For Whewell, our ability to make novel predictions and manipulations of the world when science 
is at its best verifies the synchrony of mind and world. The more precise our predictions and 
manipulations, the more mind and world come into alignment. We can think of science as the 
pursuit of the infallible alignment of mind and world. As Whewell puts it, “our knowledge is 
then most complete, then most truly deserves the name of Science, when both its elements are 
most perfect” (Whewell 1858b, 170). 
Whewell does not articulate fine-grained detail of MWmerger however. He does not posit 
mereological relations or bridging laws for example to explain what occurs at the interface of 
mind and world. Instead, he appeals to hylomorphism (FMmetaphor). Whewell refers to FMmetaphor 
as an “illustration” or a “metaphor” for the relationship between theory and fact. He uses the 
example of a die. Ivory is the substantial matter and cubeness the structural form of the die; the 
former is sensed, while the latter is conceived (Whewell 1840, I, 29–30). However, the ivory 
cannot be separated from the cube; as in Aristotle’s statue, they are one. Neither the substance of 
ivory nor the structure of a cube can stand alone; substance must have some structure and 
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structure must have some substance.5 Whewell thus draws on FMmetaphor to offer a metaphorical 
explanation of MWmerger. The product is what I will call Wsynthesis. 
Wsynthesis: Whewell’s account of the coming together of mind and world (MWmerger) in 
successful scientific inquiry by appeal to form/matter hylomorphism (FMmetaphor). 
Thus, MWmerger is the expanandum we seek to understand; FMmetaphor is the appropriate 
explanans; Wsynthesis is the explanatory framework within which we link explanandum to 
explanans. FMmetaphor as entailed in Wsynthesis explains MWmerger. I argue to this effect in some 
detail in section 4. 
Importantly, Whewell recognises that mind and world are separate during analysis. We 
conceptualise them as distinct in the process of coming to grips with their harmony. Only while 
deliberating the entwinement of theory and fact, do we separate the two as a conceptual heuristic 
strategy; “no knowledge can exist without the practical union of the two, nor any philosophy 
without their speculative separation” (Whewell 1840, I, 33). However, the distinction fades as 
we examine mind and world’s conjoined role in successful scientific inquiry. The “difference is 
unsubstantial”; the “boundary-line… melts away” (Whewell 1840, I, 25).  
Having outlined Wsynthesis as Whewell’s explanation for MWmerger in terms of FMmetaphor, we can 
return to how it may be relevant to current writers concerned with MWmerger. Wsynthesis will be of 
no interest to idealists, eliminativists or dualists since they do not advocate for MWmerger. 
Wsynthesis may however be useful those who hold both that mind and world co-constitute the 
content of perception, sensation, experience or the like and that metaphysical speculation into the 
problem should be avoided. Experience pragmatists hold such a view; Quinean naturalists and 
non-reductive physicalists arguably do likewise. From here on, I will focus on Levine’s recently 
developed experience pragmatism. This serves as a case study for how those who hold to 
MWmerger could benefit from adopting Wsynthesis entailing FMmetaphor.  
Before doing so, it is important to mention how Whewell links to contemporary pragmatism.6 
Hanson (1958) cites Whewell as an influence on his theory-ladeness of observation thesis made 
                                                             
5 We are ignoring mathematical and purely logical structures since Whewell is interested in scientific knowledge 
about the so-called physical world. 
6 See Butts (1987) and Cowles (2016) for discussion on the link between Whewell and early pragmatism. 
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famous by Kuhn (1962) and then Feyerabend (1975) (see Kordig 1971 and Boyd and Bogen 
2021 for an overview). Whewell can be thought of as anticipating Hanson et al. when he 
emphasises the role our conceptual faculties play in shaping the world as sensed in scientific 
inquiry. 
Scientific observations, says Whewell, are “idea-laden”, and each science has a particular set of 
ideas it uses to organise facts. Similarly, for Kuhn, statements about the world depend, in part, on 
our prior assumptions for their meaning and practical application; empirical facts are theory-
laden. Middle (i.e. pragmatist) Putnam similarly denies that “it makes sense to ask whether our 
concepts ‘match’ something totally uncontaminated by conceptualization” (1981, 54). Rorty 
likewise cites James and Dewey in criticising any distinction “between a cognitive nature or 
level and a noncognitive nature or level… between scheme and content, or between subject and 
object” (Rorty 1995, 285 fn 53). Even if these writers are not self-proclaimed hylomorphists, we 
can identify a clear thematic continuity from Whewell to contemporary pragmatism. As 
mentioned in section 1, Levine is critical of the conclusions Rorty draws from this collapse of 
mind/world dualism. Nonetheless, the general theory-ladeness of observation thesis that has 
become something of an orthodoxy in the philosophy of science and that was anticipated by 
Whewell is central to Levine’s argument for experience pragmatism.  
4. Applying Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor to Levine’s experience pragmatism 
I ended section 1 with the conclusion that, without the kind of fine-grained metaphysical 
explanation that pragmatism forbids, the sceptic may justifiably withhold commitment to 
MWmerger. In what follows, I argue that Whewell’s metaphorical approach can suitably answer 
the sceptic without appeal to metaphysics. The argument proceeds as follows. 
In section 4.1, I contrast reductive or low-level explanations with non-reductive high-level 
explanations and conclude that both enjoy certain domains of application. 
In section 4.2, I introduce the key notion of semantic distance. Long semantic distance equates to 
increased explanatory power, while short semantic distance equates to closeness of meaning 
between explanandum and explanans.  
In section 4.3, I argue that Whewell’s scientific inquiry rather than Levine’s experience is the 
locus of MWmerger. I also outline why FMmetaphor is a suitable metaphor for explaining MWmerger. 
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In section 4.4, I discuss the potential problem that, if explanatory power increases with semantic 
distance, then an explanans completely detached in meaning from its explanandum should grant 
maximal explanatory power, which is absurd. I thus schematise a way to find a suitable balance 
between short versus long semantic distance. 
In section 4.5, I discuss a possible objection experience pragmatists may level against my 
proposed account of MWmerger: it falls prey to the myth of the given. I show that this is not the 
case. 
4.1. Low-level versus high-level explanations 
We generally find it difficult to understand phenomena that are highly abstract or that are on very 
large or very small scales. Metaphor explains these conceptually distant phenomena in terms of 
the objects and processes within our conceptual range (see Levy 2020). On the large scale of 
climate change science for example, the atmosphere is explained as a “container” with CO2 as its 
“content”; CO2 “attacks” the atmosphere which “seeks” to “balance” input and output; while on 
the small scale of neurobiology for example, the action potential – the propagation of 
information along a nerve cell’s axon – is variously explained as “jumping”, “travelling” and 
“reinitiating itself” along the cell axon (Niebert and Gropengiesser 2015, 905–920). 
Regarding how metaphorical explanation works, Niebert and Gropengiesser write, 
[e]ach conceptual metaphor has the same mode of operation: the structure of the 
(embodied) source domain is metaphorically projected to the target domain to achieve 
understanding. The embodied conceptions in the source domain provide an inference 
pattern to reason about the target domain (2015, 905). 
Regarding the topic of this paper, MWmerger is the target domain and FMmetaphor is the source 
domain; Wsynthesis links the two. FMmetaphor as explicated in Wsynthesis grants understanding of 
MWmerger. 
Often, when we ask for an explanation, we are asking for a causal-historical account. In our case 
however, we want to know how MWmerger obtains rather than why it obtains, how it came about 
or what it will do. We are thus concerned with synchronic (non-causal) explanations rather than 
diachronic (causal, functional or teleological) explanations (see Baron and Norton 2021, 188–
190 for more on this distinction). We are concerned with a how explanation rather than a why 
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explanation of MWmerger (see Godfrey-Smith 2008 for more on how explanations). Newton-
Smith (2001) calls the relevant kind of explanation “explanation by identity”: the explanatory 
work is done by the identity between explanandum and explanans rather than the causal 
connection between them (see also Wimsatt 2007 ch 11).  
A suitable identity between explanandum and explanans must obtain in the mind of one who 
requests the explanation. The explanandum is something mysterious that can be made familiar by 
being conceptually linked to something with which one is acquainted: the explanans. A explains 
B by way of A’s likeness to B whether in terms of a likeness in composition, structure or 
behaviour. For an explanation to obtain however, A and B must be suitably linked in the 
understanding. Explanation involves an appeal to the intuitive conceptual apparatus of one 
requesting the explanation.7 Thus, if alternative modes of (how) explanation fail to capture 
suitable explanatory precision, metaphor can come into play given that it is – by definition – an 
expression of similarity intended to grant understanding. For those like the experience 
pragmatists who consider mind and world entwined but who lack a suitable explanation thereof, 
appeal to metaphor can therefore fulfil a suitable explanatory role. 
Some may wonder however why metaphor should count as genuine explanation. Does 
explanation not require talk of subphenomenal hidden variables that ground phenomena needing 
explanation? Often, if one requests an explanation, one is asking for something deeper than 
metaphor: an underlying explanans that accounts for how or why some phenomenon obtains and 
how that phenomenon fits into our overall world picture (see van der Merwe 2020). Elster for 
example states that “to explain is to provide a mechanism, to open up the black box and show the 
nuts and bolts, the cogs and wheels of the internal machinery” (1983, 24). 
It is debated however whether reductive – i.e. low-level – explanations have more explanatory 
power than holistic – i.e. high-level – explanations (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Oppenheim 
and Putnam 1958; Simon 1962; Pylyshyn 1993; Rosenberg 2006 and Kim 2008 say “yes”; Fodor 
1974; Putnam 1975; Weslake 2010; Clarke 2016 and Batterman 2018 say “no”). Pragmatists can 
accept reductive explanations up to a point, but not when they venture into the metaphysical 
domain beyond the remit of empirical confirmation. We can accept chemical explanations of 
                                                             
7 See Fischer (2014) for an informative discussion on the role of metaphor in philosophical intuitions. 
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biological phenomena, and physical explanations of chemical phenomena for example: all fall 
within the purview of empirical science. We should however reject explanations of physical 
phenomena in terms of undetectable entities such as supersymmetric strings (for now), not to 
mention logical atoms, tropes, quiddities and the like. 
 We often rightly prefer a high-level explanation on pragmatic, utilitarian grounds given that an 
empirically verified low-level explanation is unavailable. In medicine for example, depending on 
our aims, we may give priority to either low or high-level explanations. If we aim to cure a 
patient of some disease, we may give priority to low-level micro-biological factors, but if we aim 
to prevent a population from getting the disease in the first place, we should take high-level 
environmental factors into account (see van Bouwel et al. 2011 and Broadbent 2019 for detail).8  
Plausibly, it would be preferable to explain MWmerger in terms of some fundamental entities or 
structures rather than by metaphor. We would then gain an understanding of how MWmerger fits 
into the broader natural world and how it relates to other phenomena potentially explained by the 
same reductive base. Such a deep low-level explanation is however not currently available, 
hence my argument for metaphorical explanation.9 
4.2. Semantic distance; long and short 
We have discussed three kinds of (synchronic) explanation: (1) synonymy, (2) metaphor, and (3) 
reduction. (1) and (2) are high-level or what we can think of as horizontal explanations, while (3) 
is a low-level or vertical explanation. Further, as I will now outline, (1) does not increase 
semantic distance and therefore explanatory power; (2) and (3) increase semantic distance and 
therefore explanatory power even if (2) does so horizontally and (3) does so vertically.  
I am cashing out the explanatory power of metaphor in terms of semantic distance because, as 
noted in section 4.1, A explains B by way of A’s likeness to B. ‘Likeness’ denotes a semantic 
relationship between explanandum and explanans. There may indeed be other criteria and other 
ways to measure explanatory power. However, given that we are comparing metaphor to 
                                                             
8 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point. 
9 As Simon notes, “an in-principle reductionist may be at the same time a pragmatic holist” (1962, 468; see also 




reductive explanation, which clearly involves some notion of metered distance, semantic 
distance can suitably capture the value of both. Taylor’s (forthcoming) account of explanatory 
distance has notable similarities to the notion of semantic distance developed here. For Taylor, a 
suitable dependency relation – viz. metaphysical grounding – finds the correct distance between 
explanandum and explanans. Contra the view expressed here however, Taylor considers the 
relationship between explanandum and explanans to be metaphysical rather than semantic, 
making her account incompatible with pragmatism (she also does not consider the role of 
metaphorical explanation).10  
As intimated at the end of section 1, synonymy is a minimal kind of analogy compared to 
metaphor. Synonymy draws analogy between concepts close in meaning; we can say that the 
semantic distance between the two concepts is short. There is a short semantic distance between 
MWmerger’s ‘merging’ relationship and Levine’s ‘moulding’, ‘infusing’ or ‘mediating’ 
relationship; the explanatory concepts are synonyms. Conversely, in metaphor the concepts we 
are asked to analogise are further apart in meaning; the semantic distance between the two 
concepts is long. There is long semantic distance between MWmerger’s ‘merging’ relationship and 
FMmetaphor’s ‘form/matter’ hylomorphism; they are analogous, but they are not synonyms.  
My semantic distance thesis can be schematised as follows (arrows denote direction of 
increasing explanatory power): 
                         horizontal analogical explanation 
explanandum                       synonymy                                           metaphor  
                          (short semantic distance)        (long semantic distance) 
 
              vertical reductive explanation 
 
deep metaphysical explanans (long semantic distance) 
                                                             




When our willingness to engage in deep – i.e. metaphysical – explanations bottoms out, we can 
only proceed horizontally if we wish to increase explanatory power. Thus, metaphor is preferable 
to synonymy because it has longer semantic distance and therefore greater explanatory power. 
Levine’s synonyms introduced in section 1 – moulded, infused and mediated – each connote a 
coming together of two elements where one or both are transforming the other in some way. 
However, given synonymy’s short semantic distance, it has little explanatory power.  
The explanatory power associated with long semantic distance is a function of the insight an 
explanation grants to the understanding. That is, an explanation must surprise us with some new 
insight; there must be what Gopnik (1998) calls an “aha moment”. Levy writes that metaphor 
frames a target by imaginatively juxtaposing it with a familiar subject matter. In this way 
it highlights certain properties and makes accessible certain patterns of reasoning, thus 
enhancing understanding (2020, 293–294; see also Arbib and Hesse 1986, 156). 
As with surprise, there are thus elements of imagination or creativity in metaphorical explanation 
that are mostly absent in synonymy. This is because in synonymy we merely think of the 
relevant explanandum in a similar way to how we did before. Daane notes likewise that 
“[m]etaphors help thinkers and writers forge new connections, relevancies, realities and, at the 
same time, control the way they view the world” (1995, 1). We come understand some 
phenomena in an interesting new way that escapes previous puzzlement (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980; Bradie 1999). 
Thus, applying the above schema to MWmerger: 
                                       horizontal metaphorical explanation 
MWmerger                                   synonymy                                               FMmetaphor      
                              (short semantic distance)          (long semantic distance) 
 
              vertical reductive explanation 
 
deep metaphysical explanans (long semantic distance) 
18 
 
Regarding science, Levy notes that both scientific models and metaphors are forms of “surrogate 
representation” involving “employment of the imagination” (2020, 295; see also Bradie 1999).11 
According to Agosta and Brooks, scientific theories are narrative metaphors that have the 
characteristic of pointing the way to truth; “metaphor is the poetic growth medium for new 
conceptual frameworks in science” (2020, 17; see also Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Hesse 1993; 
Elgin 2006; cf. Lewontin 1963). Metaphors in science can also serve a temporary explanatory 
purpose – as heuristics or placeholders – while scientists work on some deeper explanation 
(Black 1962; Camp 2020). Scientists often seek a reductive explanation, but metaphor can fulfil 
a provisional role where reductive explanation – if preferable – is not (yet) possible (Boyd 1993).  
One of the most famous metaphors in science is Darwin’s metaphor of ‘natural selection’. Nature 
does not strictly-speaking select between organisms; ‘selection’ – as conventionally understood – 
requires an agent to do the selecting. Darwin drew the selection analogy from what is now called 
artificial selection: a breeder selects between organisms she sees fit for some anthropic purpose. 
Darwin’s natural selection metaphor presented a high-level horizontal explanation of evolution 
to those accustomed to artificial selection. Today however, most evolutionary biologists 
understand evolution in terms of a lower level vertical explanation: in terms of alleles in gene 
pools or gene frequencies in fitness space for example (see Brooks 2011; Agosta and Brooks 
2020 and Scheiner and Mindell 2020).12  
In sum, Levine’s synonymy will have more explanatory power if he increases the semantic 
distance he utilises in his efforts to explain MWmerger; that is, if he switches from synonymy to 
metaphor. This will go some way to answering the sceptic even if we do not speculate on the 
metaphysics of MWmerger.
13 For experience pragmatists and likeminded thinkers, metaphor 
                                                             
11 See Montuschi (2001) for more on different conceptions of metaphor in the philosophy of science. See Sullivan-
Clarke (2019) for an overview of how analogical reasoning can both aid and at times hamper the progress of 
science. 
12 Note the further metaphors – “pools” and “space” – at the lower explanatory level. The project to explain these 
metaphors by reference to some even lower level expanans is ongoing. See Levy (2011) for an account of metaphor 
in cellular and molecular biology. 
13 Although analogical argument is a form of ampliative reasoning, it is permissible for the pragmatist because it 
does not necessarily invoke metaphysics. 
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appears to be a viable explanatory option all things considered. As Camp quoting Emily 
Dickenson suggests, metaphors are “telling the truth but telling it slant” (2020, 324). 
4.3. The locus of MWmerger, and why FMmetaphor is a suitable explanation of MWmerger 
I propose that two features of Wsynthesis can be of use to Levine in making his account of 
MWmerger more epistemically robust and therefore better able to counter the sceptic from section 
1.2: 
1. As per Whewell, scientific inquiry, rather than experience, is the locus if MWmerger; 
2. FMmetaphor is a suitable metaphor for explaining MWmerger. 
Regarding 1, Levine argues that MWmerger occurs in experience. ‘Experience’ is however a 
notably broad concept that he does not define in any precise manner (see Kraut’s 2020 review of 
Levine’s 2019). Plausibly, one can count every moment of existence as experience, and, if 
MWmerger occurs in every such moment, then not much has been explained. Such an explanation 
amounts to the claim that mind is always aligned with world, and this is clearly not the case. Our 
everyday experience is sometimes demonstrably fallible: we experience the Sun as rotating 
around a stationary Earth for example. In such cases, mind and world are misaligned in 
experience. The scientific method has been, in part, developed to overcome our intuitive foibles 
and biases (see Pinker 2021). Whewell’s notion that mind and world interface and align most 
perfectly in successful scientific inquiry is therefore more apt as the locus of MWmerger.  
What begins as an antithesis is, for Whewell, in the end a synthesis. Successful scientific inquiry 
is the locus where mind and world synchronise, and the degree of empirical success achieved in 
scientific practice determines the degree of alignment between mind and world. Wsynthesis (with 
the help of FMmetaphor) thus explains MWmerger in a robust way. MWmerger does not occur in 
experience broadly-construed as Levine has it. Instead, it occurs within a rather narrow range of 
conditions specific to scientific inquiry functioning at its best. 
Regarding 2, even if we accept that metaphors can have the desired explanatory power, we still 
need to establish that FMmetaphor is a suitable metaphor for explaining MWmerger. I propose that the 
form/matter hylomorphism Aristotle considered constitutive of the identity of all objects nicely 
captures the way we might think of mind and world synchronised. The relationship between 
form and matter (or structure and substance) is one of mutual dependency and synchronous 
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affect. Idealism, eliminativism and dualism aside, since Kant, it has been largely accepted that 
mind and world are likewise mutually dependent in generating the identity of and truths about 
things of the world.14 Hylomorphism suitably captures the way that two elements can be so 
inextricably conjoined yet also conceptually separate. We cannot imagine form separate from 
matter or matter separate from form, yet we can somehow conceptualise them as distinct 
elements individually analysable. Likewise, mind and world jointly construct and constitute all 
things,15 yet we easily conceptualise them as separate. This state of being both one and many is 
aptly embodied in FMmetaphor. We cannot say exactly what fine-grained events or processes occur 
at the interface of mind and world, yet hylomorphism appears to capture the nature of that state 
in a suitably analogue way. 
Plausibly, by thinking of world as matter and mind as form, we come to think of world as 
substantial and dispositional, recalcitrant yet also malleable; and the way that the mind seems to 
overlay the world imbuing it with semantic and aesthetic qualities is nicely analogous to the way 
that form ostensibly does so with matter. This hylomorphic explanation captures our 
imagination, grants insight and eases our puzzlement to some notable degree. One can feel 
content that one understands MWmerger significantly better than before by thinking of it as 
analogous to FMmetaphor. Even if not a final, complete explanation, FMmetaphor has robust 
explanatory power compared to synonymy for example.  
4.4. Finding a suitable balance between short and long semantic distance 
An obvious objection is that, if explanatory power increases with semantic distance, then some 
explanans completely unrelated in meaning to its explanandum should have maximal 
explanatory power. We should make the absurd conclusion that an arbitrary analogue having 
                                                             
14 It is not clear quite which aspects of MWmerger are contributed by the mind and which are contributed by the world. 
For Kant and Whewell, the mind contributes space and time. Yet there is ongoing debate in contemporary 
philosophy of physics over the nature of space and time and to what degree they are constructed versus represented 
(see Maudlin 2012 for an overview). It appears however that the mind does contribute something (colour seems a 
fairly non-controversial example). In any case, I leave it open as to what precisely mind versus world contribute to 
MWmerger given that we are concerned here with how mind and world contribute to MWmerger and not what they 
contribute. 
15 Excluding mathematical and purely logical things (recall fn 3). 
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zero closeness of meaning to MWmerger will have maximal explanatory power. As such, I propose 
we do not ‘stretch’ semantic distance so far that the resemblance between explanandum and 
explanans is lost. There is thus a trade-off between closeness of meaning and explanatory power. 
The best analogy for the explanatory job at hand will maximise explanatory power without 
losing the semantic resemblance between explanandum and explanans.  
Darwin’s artificial selection metaphor from the last section for example explains evolution by 
analogy to selective breeding. One could also attempt to explain evolution by analogy to buffet 
dining perhaps. In both cases, desired items are selected from a variety. However, we can see 
that semantic distance is now being stretched too far resulting in loss of closeness of meaning 
between explanandum and explanans. Although explanatory power increases initially as 
closeness of meaning diminishes, it will begin to taper off as semantic distance is overstretched. 
Schematically: 
                                                  optimal explanatory power    
 
Evolution                  synonymy             artificial selection                  buffet dining                      etc…  
Returning to MWmerger, we have seen how synonymy is very close in meaning to MWmerger but 
consequently lacks explanatory power. As argued in the previous section however, FMmetaphor 
explicated in Wsynthesis suitably explains MWmerger. Consequently, it has the correct balance 
between closeness of meaning and semantic distance to maximise explanatory power. Mutatis 
mutandis: 
                                                 optimal explanatory power    
 
MWmerger                     synonymy                           FMmetaphor                                 etc…     
A suitable likeness obtains when the semantic distance between explanandum and explanans is 
neither too short nor too long. Too short, and we will gain no new insight: there will be no aha 
moment; too far and we will fail to gain understanding: we will not see the conceptual 
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connection between explanandum and explanans. We seek a suitable semantic distance between 
explanandum and explanans where the trade-off between insight and understanding is optimised. 
4.5. Possible objection: the myth of the given 
Experience pragmatists may however object that Wsynthesis falls prey to the myth of the given. For 
Dewey, it is a mistake to hold with Kant that the content of sensation can influence our 
inferences without itself having inferential content (see de Vries 2021 for detail). Levine 
presents the myth of the given in the form of a dilemma: 
if sensations are truly independent of thought… how can they be homogeneous enough 
with thought so as to solicit, or give the cue for, the right or correct thought? And if they 
are homogeneous enough with thought to solicit it, how can we say that they exist prior 
to thought, as is necessary if they are to constrain thought from the outside? (2019, 164 
original emphasis).  
As discussed in section 3, Whewell draws on Kant to argue that the facts – the content of 
sensation – are the objective half of MWmerger; theory being the subjective half. Wsynthesis may 
therefore be prone to the myth of the given. Is Whewell’s content of sensation given to thought 
without having any thought-like properties for the mind to latch onto and merge with? 
As mentioned in section 3, Whewell thinks of mind and world as separate in analysis yet united 
in reality. In scientific terms, MWmerger obtains when the form of theory and the matter of 
experiment mesh harmoniously in successful empirical inquiry. Dewey expresses a similar view; 
he writes that the 
facts by which [a] theory is to be verified or disproved are not a fixed, unchangeable, 
body; if a theory gets its verification through the facts, the facts get a transformed and 
enlarged meaning through the theory… Both idea [mind] and ‘facts’ [world] are flexible, 
and verification is the process of mutual adjustment, of organic interaction (Dewey in 
Levine 2019, 163; see Dewey 1903).  
This is Dewey’s way of overcoming the myth of the given (see Levine 2019, 164–165, 229–
230). Facts are not statically given; they are instead pliable to the influence of theory. Whewell 
likewise understands theory and fact to co-evolve in the process of scientific inquiry (section 3). 
He does not take the content of sensation to be independent of thought yet somehow also 
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influential on thought. Instead, they are mutually affective; we only conceptually separate them 
in coming to understand their unity. 
Drawing again on metaphor, we can think of Aristotle’s statue sculptor as treating form and 
matter separately during the planning and sculpting of her piece. As she works, form and matter 
interact under her guidance. They become increasingly aligned to her initial blueprint as the 
piece nears completion. Once complete, we now think of the statue as a work of art; form and 
matter are in harmony. For the sculpture to be a sculpture qua artwork – for it to have identity, 
meaning or beauty – we must consider it as a whole.  
Conclusion 
For Whewell, when empirical science is functioning at its best, mind and world are most 
perfectly aligned; the one blends into the other; they co-evolve in harmony. This merging of 
mind and world (MWmerger) is analogous to the form and matter that constitutes Aristotelian 
objects (FMmetaphor). Whewell’s form/matter metaphor (Wsynthesis) draws on FMmetaphor to articulate 
a robust account of how MWmerger obtains in successful scientific inquiry. Wsynthesis seems to 
satisfy both our intuition that mind and world are distinct and the evident truism that there is no 
God’s eye view from which to analyse their separation.  
Experience pragmatists who reject Rortian subjectivism may find it useful to draw on Wsynthesis 
entailing FMmetaphor as a way to explain MWmerger. Wsynthesis provides those who hold to MWmerger 
sans metaphysics a valuable new explanatory tool. We may at times prefer vertical reductive 
explanations, but we must sometimes be content with horizontal analogue explanations, as in the 
case of MWmerger. What exactly a deep explanation of MWmerger would look like is, in any event, 
unclear. The debate amongst metaphysicians in ongoing. Perhaps some future science will 
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